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Abstract 
We study the relation between patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting. Using 
affiliate-level data for European multinational corporations (MNCs) and employing the relative 
share of patents held by an MNC as a measure for patent concentration, we predict and find that 
tax-motivated income shifting is increasing in the degree of patent concentration. This effect is 
economically meaningful: A one standard deviation higher patent concentration increases the 
extent to which affiliate-level profits are sensitive to income-shifting incentives by 25.6 percent. 
Additional tests exploiting variation in the information set of the local tax authority suggest that 
patent concentration facilitates tax-motivated income shifting by reducing comparable information 
available to the local tax authority. Overall, our results suggest that patent concentration shapes an 
MNC’s incentives to shift income via patents. Our findings also indicate that the effectiveness of 
tax-policy measures in curtailing this form of income shifting critically depends on their ability to 
improve the information set of the local tax authority. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, patent holdings have become increasingly concentrated in firms 
with an already sizeable patent stock (Akcigit and Ates, 2019). Because multinational 
corporations (MNCs) can use intellectual property (IP), and patents in particular, for tax-
motivated income shifting (Beer and Loeprick, 2015; Griffith, Miller, and O’Connell; Grubert, 
2003), this concentration could have implications for firms’ tax strategies. In this paper, we 
examine whether and to what extent the concentration of patents is associated with tax-motivated 
income shifting.1 In addition, we shed light on the mechanism through which patent 
concentration might facilitate this behavior.  
Understanding the relation between patent concentration and the income shifting of MNCs 
is important for at least two reasons. First, several recent court cases indicate that income-
shifting strategies based on patents allow an MNC to generate significant tax savings. For 
instance, GlaxoSmithKline avoided $3.4 billion in taxes by paying intra-firm royalties to low-tax 
jurisdictions (Matthews and Whalen, 2006). Amazon in Luxembourg, Starbucks in the 
Netherlands, and Apple in Ireland used similar structures, with the latter resulting in estimated 
tax savings of $14 billion (Chee, 2019). While prior research shows that patents are used for 
income shifting (Beer and Loeprick, 2015; Griffith et al., 2014; Grubert, 2003), the factors that 
might facilitate this behavior remain largely unexplored.  
 
1 We focus on patents because this form of IP is frequently held by the foreign affiliates of an MNC while tax and 
legal restrictions imply that other intangible assets, such as trademarks, are mainly held in the MNC home country 
(Heckemeyer, Olligs, and Overesch, 2018). The wider geographical distribution of patents provides more 
opportunities to shift income and to exploit country-level differences in corporate income tax rates (Karkinsky and 
Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014). In addition, unlike other forms of intangible assets, patents are publicly filed to 
protect an invention and therefore observable in archival datasets. 
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Second, recent tax-policy initiatives, such as the OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (OECD, 2015a) and the Platform for Collaboration on Tax (IMF, OECD, UN, 
WBG, 2017), perceive patents to be a key mechanism for tax-motivated income shifting, because 
their value is hard to determine for transfer-pricing purposes. In the wake of these initiatives, 
countries are taking regulatory actions to curtail tax-motivated income shifting, for instance, by 
introducing anti-avoidance legislation (Lohse and Riedel, 2013) or by tightening tax enforcement 
(De Simone, Stomberg, and Williams, 2019b). The design of effective tax-policy measures, 
however, requires a clear understanding of the conditions under which MNCs may shift income 
via patents and the factors that facilitate this behavior.  
For tax purposes, an MNC has to value an intra-firm transaction using the “arm’s length” 
transfer price, i.e., as if the transaction had occurred between unrelated parties (OECD, 2017a). 
An MNC can justify the transfer price through pricing information from comparable transactions 
between independent firms or from its own transactions with unrelated parties (IMF et al., 2017). 
The tax authority also requires comparable information to assess the MNC’s transfer price and to 
challenge potentially aggressive tax positions (OECD, 2017a). Therefore, the availability of 
comparable information and its distribution between the MNC and the local tax authority could 
affect an MNC’s transfer-pricing strategies (De Simone, 2016). 
We hypothesize that patent concentration facilitates tax-motivated income shifting by 
limiting the amount of comparable information available to the local tax authority. Since the 
value of patents and royalty payments is often firm specific, the MNC owning the intangible 
asset has specific knowledge about the underlying value drivers. This feature implies an 
asymmetry between the information set used by the MNC to value an intra-firm transaction and 
that held by the local tax authority (Blair-Stanek, 2015; Gallemore, Huang, and Wentland, 
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2018).2 Similar to increasing patent concentration hindering knowledge diffusion in the economy 
(Akcigit and Ates, 2019; Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2019), it could also diminish the number of 
transactions between unrelated parties and reduce the information set of the local tax authority 
(De Simone and Sansing, 2018; De Waegenaere, Sansing, and Wielhouwer, 2012). Therefore, 
patent concentration could intensify the information asymmetry and make it more difficult for 
the local tax authority to assess an MNC’s transfer price for a patent or for royalty payments for 
the use of a patent. Consequently, we expect tax-motivated income shifting to be increasing in 
patent concentration. 
To examine the relation between patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting, 
we use affiliate-level unconsolidated financial statement data from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis 
database. We link Orbis with the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database PATSTAT, which 
provides detailed information on patent owners, applications, grants, and citations. We create an 
affiliate-level measure of patent concentration by dividing the number of patents held by all 
affiliates of an MNC by the sum of patents held by all other MNCs with affiliates operating in 
the same country-industry-year as the affiliate for which the measure is computed.3 Our measure 
is based on the following intuition: If an MNC holds a relatively large share of patents, 
comparable information is scarce, which facilitates income shifting from a non-patent-holding 
affiliate to a foreign patent-holding affiliate (“outbound income shifting”, see Figure 1).4 We 
 
2 Since the “true” economic value of a patent and of royalty payments is unknown, the MNC and the local tax authority 
both have incomplete information about the precise value of an intra-firm transaction. However, since the value of a 
patent is often firm specific, the MNC has more complete information than the local tax authority, leading to 
asymmetric information between the two parties. A comparable economic problem of information asymmetry under 
incomplete information arises in emissions taxation (Baron, 1985) or knowledge transfers in a sender-receiver 
framework (Lin, Geng, and Whinston, 2005). 
3 Our measure includes all patents held by an MNC. However, it is still an affiliate-level measure that varies within an 
MNC because the distribution of patents varies across the country-industry-years in which an MNC operates.  
4 In our main tests, we focus on outbound income shifting, because cross-border royalty payments threaten to erode 
the tax base of countries in which non-patent holding affiliates are located. Hence, comparable information is most 
critical for a local tax authority that assesses the royalty payments of a non-patent holding affiliate (OECD, 2015b). 
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include this measure in a modified version of the affiliate-level income-shifting model developed 
by Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and extended by De Simone, Klassen, and Seidman (2017). 
Consistent with our prediction, we find that tax-motivated income shifting is increasing in 
patent concentration. This effect is economically significant: In response to a one standard 
deviation increase in patent concentration, the semi-elasticity of the average affiliate’s return on 
assets to income shifting incentives based on statutory corporate income tax rates changes 
from  -1.33 to -1.67. This effect marks a marginal increase in tax-motivated income shifting by 
25.6 percent.5 We also find a significant increase in the sensitivity of affiliate-level return on 
assets to incremental shifting incentives associated with IP-box regimes, providing preferential 
tax rates on IP income (e.g., royalty payments). Our results hold when calculating patent 
concentration based on patent citations as a proxy for patent value, when applying alternative 
measures of income-shifting incentives, and when excluding loss affiliates from the sample. 
Overall, these results suggest that the degree of patent concentration is an important driver of 
tax-motivated income shifting.  
To shed light on whether asymmetric information between the MNC and the local tax 
authority drives our main result, we study two settings in which the set of comparable 
information available to the local tax authority is likely to vary. First, we exploit comparable 
information associated with local patent-holding affiliates. To detect an aggressive transfer-
pricing strategy, tax authorities could benchmark the transfer price set by the MNC against the 
price of transactions between local-patent holdings affiliates of other MNCs and their unrelated 
 
However, our results are qualitatively similar when including patent-holding affiliates. In supplementary tests, we 
separately examine patent-holding affiliates and find that patent concentration is also associated with the extent to 
which MNCs shift income into these affiliates (see Section 6.3). 
5 Our baseline estimates suggest that a one percent increase in income-shifting incentives is associated with a 1.33 
percent lower return on assets at the affiliate level. A one standard deviation higher patent concentration implies a 
sensitivity of -1.67, which is equivalent to a 25.6 percent change (= -1.67 / -1.33 - 1).  
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customers (De Simone, 2016). Therefore, we expect a large share of local patent-holding 
affiliates to mitigate the relation between patent concentration and tax-motivated income 
shifting. Our results are consistent with this expectation, providing initial evidence that patent 
concentration limits comparable information available to the local tax authority.  
Second, we examine changes in country-level tax enforcement that are likely to alter the 
local tax authority’s set of comparable information. Specifically, we exploit increases in the 
value of completed tax assessments and the percentage of staff used in tax audits (OECD, 2011, 
2013, 2015b, 2017b). Both proxies relate to enforcement actions that provide the local tax 
authority an opportunity to collect comparable information. Supporting the argument that patent 
concentration limits comparable information available to the local tax authority, we find that an 
increase in these enforcement actions weakens the relation documented in our main tests. To rule 
out that changes in a country’s general tax-enforcement environment drive this result, we re-run 
our tests using reductions in the costs of tax collection as a proxy for increases in the overall 
efficiency of tax collection and administration (OECD, 2013), and find no evidence for a 
mitigating effect. Taken together, these results support the argument that patent concentration 
facilitates tax-motivated income shifting, by limiting the set of comparable information available 
to the local tax authority, and by increasing information asymmetry between the MNC and the 
local tax authority. 
We conduct several additional tests to rule out alternative explanations for our findings and 
to further explore the relation between patent concentration and income shifting. First, we 
continue to find that tax-motivated income shifting is increasing in patent concentration after 
controlling for market power, MNC group size, and R&D activity. Second, we perform a 
falsification test based on income shifting via debt. We find no relation between patent 
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concentration and this income-shifting channel, providing comfort that patent concentration 
rather than general firm characteristics explains our results. Third, we examine patent-holding 
affiliates and find that patent concentration is also associated with inbound income shifting. This 
result suggests that limited comparable information increases the attractiveness of an affiliate as 
a target for shifted income.  
Our study makes several contributions. First, we expand research on the determinants of 
tax-motivated income shifting (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003; Blouin, Robinson, and Seidman, 
2018; De Simone et al., 2017; Markle, 2016; McGuire, Rane, and Weaver, 2018) by identifying 
patent concentration as an important driver of this behavior. In this regard, our study also adds to 
emerging research on the role of comparable information in tax-related transfer pricing. 
De Simone (2016), for instance, documents that less comparable information could constrain an 
MNC in justifying an aggressive transfer-pricing strategy, which is associated with less income 
shifting. Our results, in contrast, suggest that, because the value of patents and royalty payments 
is often firm specific, patent concentration and the associated reduction in comparable 
information facilitate income shifting via patents. More generally, because patent concentration 
depends on the distribution of patents within an industry, our results highlight that industry 
landscapes and the availability of comparable assets or firms shape income-shifting incentives. 
On a policy level, our tax-enforcement results indicate that only policy measures that improve 
the local tax authority’s set of comparable information are effective in curtailing tax-motivated 
income shifting via patents. 
Second, our findings add to research on specific income-shifting channels. While prior 
studies show that MNCs use patents to shift income (Beer and Loeprick, 2015; Griffith et al., 
2014; Grubert, 2003), we document that patent concentration shapes the incentives for MNCs to 
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engage in income shifting. Moreover, prior studies have focused on shifting incentives associated 
with statutory corporate income tax rates (Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013; Heckemeyer and 
Overesch, 2017). Since we find that MNCs are sensitive to incremental shifting incentives 
induced by IP-box regimes, our findings suggest that researchers need to consider these 
incentives in order to capture the full extent of income shifting via patents. Tests limited to 
statutory corporate income tax rates could be insufficient to achieve this objective.  
Finally, and more broadly, our study contributes to the innovation and patenting literature. 
Prior research in this area finds that a higher concentration of patent holdings is associated with a 
decline in knowledge diffusion and a slowdown in business dynamics (Akcigit and Ates, 2019; 
Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2019). We add to this literature by showing that patent concentration 
drives the extent to which MNCs use patents to shift income and that patent concentration 
increases information asymmetry between the MNC and the local tax authority.  
2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Transfer pricing for tax purposes and the Arm’s Length Standard 
While market forces determine the price for a transaction between unrelated parties, an 
MNC has to set a transfer price when valuing an intra-firm transaction for tax purposes. The 
OECD defines a transfer price as “the price at which an enterprise transfers physical goods and 
intangible property or provides services to associated enterprises” (OECD, 2010). According to 
the OECD Transfer-Pricing Guidelines, the price set by the MNC has to be consistent with the 
“arm’s length standard”. This principle, which also applies to U.S. MNCs under Internal 
Revenue Code §482, requires the price charged for an intra-firm transaction to be equivalent to 
the price charged between unrelated parties for similar transactions entered into under similar 
economic circumstances (OECD, 2017a).  
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The OECD Transfer-Pricing Guidelines provide several methods to determine the arm’s 
length transfer price. An MNC has to select the most appropriate method by analyzing the 
functions performed, assets contributed, and the risks borne by the affiliates involved in the 
transaction (OECD, 2017a).6 All methods require information from economically comparable 
transactions to derive inputs such as mark-ups or profit margins, necessary to value an intra-firm 
transaction. The MNC can obtain comparable information from comparable transactions between 
independent firms or from its own transactions with unrelated parties. The latter includes firms 
operating in the same industry, performing similar functions, and bearing similar risks. If 
comparable information is unavailable, the MNC may use valuation techniques to estimate the 
arm’s length transfer price (OECD, 2017a). 
The local tax authority also requires comparable information to detect and challenge 
potentially aggressive transfer-pricing strategies. More specifically, the tax authority could assess 
the transfer price set by an MNC by benchmarking it against the prices of economically similar 
transactions between independent firms. Consistent with this argument, anecdotal evidence from 
court cases suggest that local tax authorities collect comparable information when assessing 
whether the transfer-pricing strategies of an MNC are compliant with the arm’s length standard 
(Amazon v. Commissioner, 2017; Veritas v. Commissioner, 2009). 
The amount of comparable information available depends on the characteristics of an intra-
firm transaction. For goods and services sold on external markets, market prices are readily 
observable (IMF et al., 2017). However, comparable information may be scarce or difficult to 
obtain for goods or services without an external market. This also applies to intra-firm 
transactions involving patents (De Simone and Sansing, 2018; De Waegenaere et al., 2012). 
 
6 An MNC may choose from traditional transaction methods or cost plus methods (OECD, 2017a).  
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These assets are therefore considered hard to value for transfer-pricing purposes, posing a 
challenge to the arm’s length standard and to local tax authorities scrutinizing an MNC’s 
transfer-pricing strategies ( IMF et al., 2017; Veritas vs. Commissioner, 2009). 
2.2 Patents and tax-motivated income shifting  
Because of their global operations, MNCs can lower their worldwide tax burden by shifting 
income to low-tax countries. Patents are perceived as a key element for tax-motivated income 
shifting(OECD, 2015a).7 In order to shift income, an MNC has to develop or locate a patent in a 
low-tax jurisdiction (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012). If a high-tax affiliate subsequently pays tax-
deductible royalty payments for the intra-firm use of the patent to the low-tax patent-holding 
affiliate, income is relocated from the high-tax jurisdiction to the low-tax jurisdiction, reducing 
the overall tax burden of the MNC.8  
Prior research employs different approaches to identify income shifting via patents. One 
stream of research studies the relation between corporate income tax rates and the locational 
choice for patents. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) find the 
statutory corporate income tax rate is negatively related to the level of intangible investment and 
the number of patent applications in a given country. Griffith et al. (2014) show that MNCs 
strategically locate valuable patents in countries that offer tax benefits for IP income. A second 
 
7 Other income-shifting strategies are based on intra-firm interest payments and the manipulation of transfer prices for 
the intra-firm sale of goods, services, or assets (Dharmapala, 2014; Dyreng and Markle, 2016; Riedel, 2018; Hopland, 
Lisowsky, Mardan, and Schindler, 2018).  
8 Patents can be used for least two additional income-shifting strategies. First, an MNC can develop a patent in a high-
tax country and then transfer the IP to a foreign affiliate at an artificially low transfer price. Second, an MNC can enter 
into a cost sharing agreement (CSA), where the parent of the MNC contributes domestically developed IP in exchange 
for an artificially low “buy-in” payment from its foreign affiliate. In both cases, the patent ends up in the hands of a 
low-tax affiliate, reducing the tax burden on any future profits earned from the patent (Avi-Yonah, 2012; Blair-Stanek, 
2015). We focus on income-shifting strategies based on intra-firm royalty payments, because cost contribution 
agreements, which are similar to CSAs, are less attractive for MNCs headquartered in the European Union (EU). The 
local tax authorities in the EU follow the OECD guidelines, which, in comparison to the IRS guidelines in the U.S., 
require an active involvement to share the benefits of IP developed under a CSA (Okten, 2013). 
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stream of research examines an MNC’s transfer-pricing strategies and shows that firms respond 
to country-level differences in tax rates by adjusting their intra-firm transfer prices. This result is 
concentrated in MNCs with high levels of intangible assets and greater organizational 
complexity (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003; Clausing, 2003). Moreover, Grubert (2003) finds 
that the profits of U.S. MNCs respond to income-shifting incentives and that this effect is 
strongest for R&D-intensive firms. De Simone, Mills, and Stomberg (2019a) use IRS data to 
construct an outbound-shifting score and find that firms in high-tech industries are more likely to 
shift income out of the U.S. Similarly, De Simone, Huang, and Krull (2020) find a positive 
relation between foreign profit margins and the domestic R&D activity of U.S. firms. 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
As noted, the availability and the distribution of comparable information depends on the 
characteristics of an intra-firm transaction. Comparable information for the pricing of intra-firm 
royalty payments is scarce, because market prices for these payments are often unavailable 
(Blair-Stanek, 2015; De Simone and Sansing, 2018; De Waegenaere et al., 2012). In addition, the 
value of a patent – and the associated royalty payments – is largely firm-specific and its owner 
has greater knowledge about the profit potential and the underlying value drivers than the local 
tax authority (Gallemore et al., 2018; Qiu and Wan, 2015). Therefore, the “true” economic value 
of intra-firm royalty payments is often ambiguous and both parties have incomplete information 
sets. However, the information set of the MNC owning the patent appears more complete than 
that of the local tax authority. This implies an asymmetry between the information used by the 
MNC to value an intra-firm transaction and that held by the local tax authority when evaluating 
the MNC’s transfer-pricing strategy. 
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Akcigit and Ates (2019) show that patent concentration hinders knowledge diffusion in an 
economy. Similarly, we expect patent concentration to reduce the information set of the local tax 
authority and to intensify the information asymmetry. That is, if a small number of firms in an 
industry holds a large share of patents (i.e., patent concentration is high), the number of 
comparable transactions involving patents is low, and knowledge about the underlying value 
drivers is concentrated in a small subset of firms. As a result, the local tax authority lacks 
benchmarks to assess the transfer price set by the MNC (Mescall and Klassen, 2018; OECD, 
2015b; OECD, 2017a), and the MNC might be able to justify a broader range of potential 
transfer prices. Moreover, if comparable information is scarce, the MNC could substantiate the 
arm’s length transfer price with pricing information from its own transactions or by applying 
valuation techniques to estimate the transfer price. These transfer prices seem more difficult to 
verify for the tax authority than the prices derived from transactions between independent firms. 
Hence, high patent concentration is likely to reduce the risk that the local tax authority might 
detect and challenge an aggressive tax position, increasing an MNC’s incentives to shift income. 
Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that tax-motivated income shifting is increasing in the 
degree of patent concentration. This leads to our main hypothesis: 
H1:  Tax-motivated income shifting is increasing in the degree of patent concentration. 
There are at least two reasons we might not find the hypothesized relation. First, several 
countries have recently tightened their tax enforcement (De Simone et al., 2019b) where the 
OECD stresses the importance of assessing firms with high intangible-asset intensity (OECD, 
2017a). If these efforts increase the risk that the local tax authority might detect and challenge a 
transfer-pricing strategy, an MNC’s incentives to shift income might diminish, and we might not 
find a relation between patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting. Second, recent 
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survey evidence suggests that a significant share of MNCs prefers compliance with the arm’s 
length standard over aggressive income shifting (Klassen, Lisowsky, and Mescall, 2017). If 
MNCs seek tax compliance or income-shifting aggressiveness independent from the degree of 
patent concentration, we also might not find support for our hypothesis.  
3. Research design, data, and sample  
3.1 Baseline income-shifting model  
Our research design is based on the income-shifting model developed by Hines and Rice 
(1994) and expanded by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). The main challenge to empirically 
examine tax-motivated income shifting is observing taxable income prior to income shifting 
(“true income”), because the book income reflects the income after shifting has occurred. The 
model by Hines and Rice (1994) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008) applies a Cobb-Douglas 
production function to estimate an affiliate’s true income as a function of capital, labor, and 
productivity. We use the recent extension by De Simone et al. (2017), which allows us to keep 
unprofitable affiliates in the sample.9 Equation (1) depicts this baseline income-shifting model: 
 𝐿𝑁(1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡  + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁(𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑁(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑡 +
𝛽6𝛥𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑐𝑗𝑡  + 𝛽7𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     
The dependent variable, LN(1+ROA) is the natural logarithm of affiliate i’s return on assets 
(ROA) in year t. Adding 1 to ROA before taking logs keeps unprofitable affiliate-years in the 
sample (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; De Simone et al., 2017). We follow prior research (Blouin 
 
9 We include unprofitable affiliates, because prior research suggests that affiliate-level losses could affect an MNC’s 
incentives to shift income via patents. Hopland et al. (2018) show that royalty payments offer sufficient flexibility to 
reap the tax benefits associated with temporary losses. In Table 8, we modify the income-shifting model to exclude 
loss affiliates. Results are consistent with our main findings, suggesting that loss affiliates do not drive our results.  
(1) 
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et al., 2018; De Simone, 2016; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Klassen and Laplante, 2012; Markle, 
2016) and use book income as a proxy for affiliate i’s taxable income. ROA is calculated as 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), divided by total assets. We use EBIT instead of pre-
tax income, because EBIT is unaffected by income shifting via intra-firm interest payments 
(Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017), providing a cleaner identification of the income-shifting 
channel of interest. In Section 6.2, we explore income shifting via interest payments in a 
falsification test. 
We include the logarithm of affiliate tangible fixed assets and affiliate compensation 
expenses to proxy for capital and labor input. To measure productivity, we add IndustryROA as 
the median ROA by country-industry-year based on all affiliates and independent firms operating 
in a two-digit NACE country-industry-year (De Simone et al., 2017). LN(Age) is the natural 
logarithm of affiliate age, calculated as year t less the first year affiliate i appears in the database. 
To capture profitability shocks at the affiliate country- and the affiliate industry-level, we include 
annual GDP growth in affiliate country c (GDPGrowth) and the annual percentage change in 
total sales of all affiliates and independent firms by two-digit NACE country-industry-year 
(ΔMarketSize). 
C captures the tax incentive to shift income for affiliate i in year t. Following Huizinga and 
Laeven (2008), we calculate C based on weighted tax-rate differentials between affiliate i and all 
other affiliates of the MNC (see Equation (2)). We calculate tax-rate differentials based on 
statutory corporate income tax rates. In addition, we follow Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and 
weigh the tax-rate differentials by total affiliate assets (K) to account for the costs of income 
shifting, which are assumed to increase in an affiliate’s scale of operations.  
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𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  
1
(1−𝜏𝑖𝑡)
∗  
∑
𝐾𝑘𝑡
(1−𝜏𝑘𝑡)
∗(𝜏𝑖𝑡−𝜏𝑘𝑡)
𝑛
𝑘 ≠𝑖
∑
𝐾𝑘,𝑡
(1−𝜏𝑘𝑡)
𝑛
𝑘 ≠𝑖
 
By including weighted tax-rate differentials between affiliate i and all other affiliates of the 
MNC, this measure captures the sum of all income-shifting incentives associated with affiliate i, 
taking the costs of income shifting into account. C could take positive or negative values. A 
higher (lower) value of C suggests that affiliate i is a high-tax (low-tax) affiliate relative to all 
other affiliates of the MNC, implying a tax incentive to shift income to (from) affiliates with 
lower (higher) values of C. A negative coefficient on 𝛽7 therefore indicates that the taxable 
income of affiliate i is sensitive to shifting incentives associated with statutory corporate income 
tax rates. Less taxable income is reported in high-tax affiliates while more taxable income is 
reported in low-tax affiliates, providing evidence for tax-motivated income shifting. C varies 
across affiliates due to country-level differences in statutory corporate income tax rates, 
differences in tax-rate differentials between the affiliates of the MNC, and affiliate-level 
differences in income-shifting costs. C varies over time due to changes in statutory corporate 
income tax rates. We add Loss as an indicator variable with the value of one if EBIT of affiliate i 
is less than zero in year t. Since income-shifting incentives could differ for unprofitable affiliates, 
we interact C with Loss (De Simone et al., 2017). 
Finally, we include a series of fixed effects. First, we add affiliate country-fixed effects 
(𝛼𝑐) to control for country-specific deviations from the statutory corporate tax rate (De Simone, 
2016) and for time invariant country-level differences in tax regimes and institutions. Second, we 
include affiliate industry-fixed effects (𝛼𝑗) to capture time invariant differences in income-
shifting opportunities, productivity, and profitability across industries. Third, we add year-fixed 
(2) 
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effects (𝛼𝑡) to absorb the effects of business cycles and economic shocks. We cluster standard 
errors by affiliate to account for serial correlation in the data (Petersen, 2009).  
3.2 Extended income-shifting model to test for the effect of patent concentration 
To test our hypothesis, we extend Equation (1) as follows:  
 𝐿𝑁(1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡  + ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  + 𝛽7𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶_𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽10𝐶 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐶_𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽13𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽14𝐶_𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     
First, we add C_Patents and its interaction with Loss to account for income-shifting 
incentives not captured by C. Several countries in our sample offer IP-box regimes and provide 
preferential tax rates for IP income (Bornemann, Laplante, and Osswald, 2019; Evers, Miller, 
and Spengel, 2015). To obtain C_Patents, we recalculate C for affiliate i in year t, using IP tax 
rates instead of statutory corporate income tax rates (C_IP). We then subtract C from C_IP to 
isolate incremental income-shifting incentives associated with IP tax rates.10 A negative 
coefficient on 𝛽8 indicates that the taxable income of affiliate i is sensitive to these shifting 
incentives, again providing evidence for tax-motivated income shifting.11 
Second, we include PatentConc as an affiliate-level measure for patent concentration. For 
affiliate i, we derive the number of patents held by all domestic and foreign affiliates of the MNC 
 
10 We compute C_Patents to capture incremental income-shifting incentives associated with IP tax rates, because IP-
box regimes differ in the conditions under which patent income may qualify for this tax incentive. For instance, the 
UK offers a reduced tax rate for income derived from acquired patents that were further developed by the acquirer. 
The Portuguese IP-box regime, in contrast, is limited to income from self-developed patents (Evers et al., 2015). Since 
our data does not provide information on whether a patent is eligible for this tax incentive, we include separate 
measures for income-shifting incentives associated with statutory tax rates (C) and the incremental incentives 
associated with IP tax rates (C_Patents). In a robustness test, we include C_IP and find consistent results (Table 8). 
11 We provide a numerical example in Appendix B. In addition, we to provide background on the calculation of 
C_Patents and outline why a negative coefficient on 𝛽8 is consistent with tax-motivated income shifting. 
(3) 
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in year t. We divide this number by the sum of patents held by domestic and foreign affiliates of 
all other MNCs operating in the same country-industry-year as affiliate i.12 As depicted in Figure 
1, PatentConc is based on the following intuition: If affiliate i belongs to an MNC that holds a 
small fraction of patents compared to all other MNCs operating in the same country-industry-
year, patent concentration is low. When assessing the transfer price for intra-firm royalty 
payments of affiliate i, the local tax authority should have access to a large set of comparable 
information from the transactions of other MNCs with their unrelated customers (panel A).13 If 
affiliate i belongs to an MNC that holds a large fraction of patents, patent concentration is high 
and comparable information from transactions of other MNC is limited (panel B). 
Overall, our measure captures differences in the incentive to shift income via patents from 
a non-patent holding affiliate (affiliate i) to a foreign patent-holding affiliate. We focus on this 
outbound shifting mechanism, because cross-border royalty payments threaten to erode the tax 
base of countries in which non-patent holding affiliates are located (OECD, 2015b). By limiting 
PatentConc to affiliates of MNCs operating in the same country-industry-year, we also measure 
the degree of patent concentration for affiliate i relative to its industry peers. This approach 
mitigates concerns that differences in patenting strategies across industries might affect our 
measure (Hall, Helmers, Rogers, Sena, 2014).  Moreover, the degree of internationalization is a 
key criterion for tax authorities in identifying comparable firms (OECD, 2015b; IMF et al., 
 
12 We provide a numerical example in Appendix B.  
13 Ideally, one would like to observe licensing agreements between MNCs and their unrelated customers to measure 
the extent of comparable information available to the local tax authority. These are unobservable, so we assume that 
the relative share of patents held by an MNC is correlated with the number of licensing agreements in a country-
industry-year. The results of our tests based on local-patent holdings affiliates (Table 6) support this assumption.  
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2017). Therefore, and because we are interested in cross-border royalty payments, we focus on 
patents held by the affiliates of MNCs.14 
To examine whether patent concentration is associated with tax-motivated income shifting, 
we interact PatentConc with C and C_Patents, respectively. If patent concentration facilitates 
tax-motivated income shifting, we expect 𝛽13 and 𝛽14 to be negative. That is, the extent to which 
taxable income reported by affiliate i is sensitive to C and C_Patents should increase in patent 
concentration.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
3.3 Data and sample  
We obtain affiliate-level unconsolidated financial statement data and ownership data from 
Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database for the period 2008 to 2016. We obtain patent data from the 
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database PATSTAT.15 This database is maintained by the 
European Patent Office (EPO) and offers rich bibliographic data on patents.16 We merge 
PATSTAT with Orbis using Bureau van Dijk’s reverse search algorithm, taking into account the 
affiliate’s name and country of residence. This procedure links patent ownership to the affiliates 
recorded in Orbis, yielding the location of patent holdings within an MNC.  
We start our sample selection by identifying MNCs with affiliates in at least two different 
countries. We require direct and indirect ownership links of greater than 50 percent within the 
 
14 Our main inferences are unchanged when including independent firms in the calculation of PatentConc. 
15 We use the “Autumn 2017” edition of PATSTAT.  
16 PATSTAT collects data from more than 100 patent offices worldwide, including patent applications and grants from 
patent offices in the member states of the European Patent Convention (EPC) and other major patent offices, such as 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). For more information, see https://www.epo.org/searching-
for-patents/business/patstat.html#tab-1. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3600839
- 18 - 
MNC.17 To be consistent with prior research (De Simone, 2016), we require the parent of the 
MNC and its foreign affiliates to be located in a European country.18 We also require non-
missing NACE industry codes and positive values for total assets, tangible fixed assets, and 
compensation expenses. These requirements yield an initial sample of 163,865 affiliate-year 
observations, representing 28,733 unique affiliates and 9,088 unique MNCs.  
We exclude affiliates of MNCs active in banking or insurance industries, because these 
sectors provide distinct income-shifting incentives (Merz and Overesch, 2016). We require the 
MNC to be profitable as a group since consolidated losses could alter shifting incentives (De 
Simone et al., 2017).19 We further exclude observations with missing values for EBIT and with 
values for LN(1+ROA) less than or equal to zero. Finally, we drop observations with insufficient 
data to calculate our regression variables. The final sample includes 138,293 affiliate-year 
observations, representing 26,608 unique affiliates and 8,489 unique MNCs. The average MNC 
in our sample owns 3.1 affiliates, and we observe 5.2 observations per affiliate. We summarize 
the sample selection in Appendix A.  
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the sample composition by country.20 We observe the largest number of 
affiliate-years for France, Italy, and Spain while the number is lowest for Ireland, Iceland, and 
 
17 Ownership information in Orbis is stale and reflects the status of the last year in the dataset. This limitation could 
lead to measurement error, because we might classify an independent firm that was acquired by an MNC later in the 
sample as being an affiliate throughout. Because we examine tax-motivated income shifting in a cross-border context, 
these ownership changes tend to bias against us finding results. Therefore, our effect sizes are likely to constitute 
lower bound estimates.  
18 More specifically, we limit our sample to affiliates located in the member states of the European Union and the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The latter includes Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Iceland. We 
relax this requirement when calculating C and C_Patents for affiliate i and take non-European affiliates with data on 
total assets into account.  
19 We follow De Simone et al. (2017) and calculate the consolidated return on sales using data for the affiliates in our 
sample. We drop affiliate-years belonging to an MNC with a negative return on sales in year t. 
20 Due to our sample selection requirements, the final sample is limited to affiliates located in 27 European countries. 
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Switzerland. In columns 2 and 3, we present information on corporate income tax rates and IP 
tax rates, respectively. The mean corporate income tax rate varies across countries and ranges 
from 10 percent in Bulgaria to 35 percent in Malta. Similarly, the mean IP tax rate ranges from 6 
percent in Luxembourg to 30 percent in Germany. 12 countries in our sample operate an IP-box 
regime, resulting in differences between the mean corporate income tax rate and the mean IP tax 
rate. A difference ranging from 2 percentage points in Italy to 27 percentage points in Belgium 
indicates that C based on statutory corporate income tax rates is unlikely to capture all income-
shifting incentives associated with patents.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. We winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and the 
99th percentile to mitigate the influence of outliers. Panel A shows information for the full 
sample. The average affiliate in our sample reports earnings before interest and taxes of EUR 
3.08 million (EBIT), a return on assets of 7.5 percent (ROA), tangible fixed assets of EUR 7.05 
million (TangibleAssets), and compensation expenses of EUR 5.86 million (CompExpense). 17.1 
percent of the affiliate-years report a negative EBIT (Loss). The average affiliate in our sample 
holds 2.85 patents (PatStock) and belongs to an MNC owning 35.62 patents (SumPatents).21 The 
median values of PatStock and SumPatents are both equal to zero. This suggests that relatively 
few firms in our sample hold patents, which is consistent with the findings in Hall et al. (2014).  
Panels B and C present descriptive statistics for patent-holding and non-patent-holding 
affiliates, respectively. 10.4 percent of the affiliate-years in our sample hold at least one patent 
(panel B). These affiliates are larger (TangibleAssets) and exhibit a higher EBIT and higher 
 
21 PatStock is the number of granted patents held by affiliate i in year t. We include all patents granted in the last 19 
years, because patents generally protect an invention for 20 years. 
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compensation expenses (CompExpense) than non-patent-holding affiliates (p < 0.01; two-tailed). 
However, both groups do not differ in their return on assets (ROA; p = 0.79; two-tailed). In panel 
B, the mean (median) value of PatStock is equal to 27.3 (5), which suggests that patent holdings 
are strongly skewed even among patent-holding affiliates.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 3 reports Pearson correlation coefficients for the full sample. Pairwise correlations 
between our regression variables are generally consistent with prior research using 
unconsolidated financial statement data for European affiliates (De Simone et al., 2017; Huizinga 
and Laeven, 2008). Further, C and C_Patents are weakly correlated (ρ = 0.13), which indicates 
that both measures capture distinct income-shifting incentives. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
4. Main results 
4.1 Extending the income-shifting model 
Before testing our hypothesis, we extend the income-shifting model by De Simone et al. 
(2017) and include our measure for incremental income-shifting incentives associated with IP-
box regimes (C_Patents). We report the results in Table 4. In column 1, we replicate their model 
on the full sample and find consistent results. That is, the negative and significant coefficient on 
C (p < 0.01) provides evidence for tax-motivated income shifting, and the coefficients estimates 
on C (-0.097) and C*Loss (0.289) are close to the estimates reported in De Simone et al. (2017) 
(-0.088 and 0.251).22 In columns 2 and 3, we include C_Patents and the interaction of C_Patents 
 
22 The coefficients on C and C*Loss translate into a semi-elasticity at the mean ROA of -0.97 for profitable affiliates 
and of +1.79 for unprofitable affiliates. These elasticities are slightly larger than the estimates in De Simone et al. 
(2017).  
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with Loss, respectively. While the results for the initial variables are similar to those reported 
with column 1, the coefficients on C_Patents and C_Patents*Loss are insignificant in both 
columns (p > 0.17).23 These results suggest that adding C_Patents and C_Patents*Loss does not 
alter the inferences drawn from the De Simone et al. (2017) income-shifting model.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
4.2 Tests of H1: Patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting  
To test our hypothesis, we examine the relation between patent concentration and tax-
motivated income shifting. In this test, we limit the sample to non-patent-holding affiliates, 
because PatentConc captures the incentive to shift income via intra-firm royalty payments from a 
non-patent-holding affiliate to a foreign patent-holding affiliate. We estimate Equation (3) and 
present the results in Table 5.  
Consistent with the results in Table 4, the coefficient on C is negative and significant in 
column 1 (p < 0.01), while the coefficient on C_Patents is again insignificant (p = 0.83). Most 
importantly, the coefficients on C*PatentConc and C_Patents*PatentConc are both negative and 
significant (p < 0.04). These results suggest that tax-motivated income shifting is increasing in 
patent concentration, providing support for H1. In column 2, we replace the continuous measure 
for patent concentration with an indicator variable taking the value of one if PatentConc is in the 
top sample quartile (HighPatentConc). The negative and significant coefficients on 
 
23 The insignificant coefficient on C_Patents is reasonable, because the descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggest that a 
relatively small number of affiliates hold patents in our sample. Thus, the average affiliate in our sample is unlikely 
to be used for income shifting based on patents, which is a precondition to benefit from the incremental income-
shifting incentives captured by C_Patents. When limiting the sample in column 2 to affiliates of MNCs that hold at 
least one patent, the coefficients on C and C_Patents are negative and significant (p < 0.03). 
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C*HighPatentConc and C_Patents*HighPatentConc (p < 0.08) are consistent with column 1 and 
again suggest that affiliates with high patent concentration tend to shift more income.  
In economic terms, the coefficient estimates on C (-0.087) and C*PatentConc (-0.144) in 
column 1 imply a semi elasticity of -1.33. That is, for the average affiliate in our sample, a one 
percent increase in C is associated with a 1.33 percent lower return on assets.24 Based on this 
estimate, a one standard deviation increase in PatentConc (0.162) leads to a semi elasticity of -
1.67. This change marks a 25.6 percent greater sensitivity of the average affiliate’s return on 
assets to income-shifting incentive captured by C ([-1.67 / -1.33] – 1), which is consistent with 
25.6 percent more tax-motivated income shifting at the margin. The semi elasticity of the 
average affiliate’s return on assets to incremental shifting incentives associated with IP-box 
regimes (C_Patents) changes from -0.01 to -0.16 in response to a one standard deviation increase 
in patent concentration.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
Taken together, the results in this section support our hypothesis: Tax-motivated income 
shifting is increasing in patent concentration. Moreover, the degree of patent concentration is an 
economically important determinant of tax-motivated income shifting.  
5. Testing for the underlying mechanism 
In this section, we shed light on the mechanism behind our main results. We argue that 
patent concentration increases the incentives to shift income by limiting comparable information 
 
24 We calculate the semi-elasticity assuming a one percent change in C: (exp[(coefficient on C + coefficient on 
C*PatentConc * Mean PatentConc) * Δ C + LN(mean ROA + 1)] – 1 – mean ROA) / mean ROA; (exp[(-0.087 + -
0.144 * 0.042) * 0.01 + LN(0.075 + 1)] – 1 – 0.075) / 0.075 = -1.33. Our estimate falls in the range of estimates 
provided by prior studies (see Dharmapala (2014) and Riedel (2018) for reviews of the estimates provided by prior 
research). 
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available to the local tax authority and by intensifying asymmetric information between the 
MNC and the local tax authority. If this mechanism explains our results, we expect the relation 
between patent concentration and income shifting to vary with the extent of comparable 
information available to the local tax authority. To test this conjecture, we exploit two settings 
that are likely to provide variation in comparable information. First, we study the presence of 
local patent-holding affiliates. Second, we examine changes in tax-enforcement actions that 
allow the local tax authority to collect comparable information. 
5.1 Local patent-holding affiliates  
When assessing a transfer-pricing strategy, the local tax authority could benchmark the 
transfer price determined by the MNC against the prices set by unrelated firms performing 
similar functions and bearing similar risks (OECD, 2017a). As suggested by Figure 1, the local 
tax authority could thereby draw on the transactions of other MNCs with their unrelated 
customers. If patent concentration limits the local tax authority’s set of comparable information, 
the relation found in our main tests should be weaker in the presence of sufficient local patent-
holding affiliates. Such a mitigating effect would also corroborate the framework proposed in 
Figure 1 and support the rationale underlying our measure for patent concertation. 
We create HighCompInfo as an indicator variable with the value of one if the share of local 
patent-holding affiliates relative to all affiliates operating in the country-industry-year of 
affiliate i is in the top sample quartile.25 We include HighCompInfo in Equation (3) and interact 
this variable with C, C_Patents, PatentConc, C*PatentConc, and C_Patents*PatentConc, 
respectively. Based on the above arguments, we expect a weaker relation between patent 
 
25 Instead of using the affiliates included in our sample, we calculate HighCompInfo based on all affiliates available 
in the Orbis database, alleviating concerns that country-level differences in data availability affect our inferences.  
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concentration and tax-motivated income shifting in country-industry-years characterized by a 
high share of local-patent holding affiliates, suggesting positive coefficients on both triple 
interactions. We present the results in Table 6.  
In column 1, we use the continuous patent-concentration measure and continue to find 
negative and significant coefficients on C*PatentConc and C_Patents*PatentConc (p < 0.03).26 
These results again suggest that tax-motivated income shifting is increasing in patent 
concentration. The coefficients on the triple interactions C*PatentConc*HighCompInfo and 
C_Patents*PatentConc*HighCompInfo are positive but insignificant (p = 0.17 and p = 0.35). 
However, for affiliates with high patent concentration (column 2), the coefficients on both triple 
interactions are positive and significant (p < 0.03). For these affiliates, the presence of local 
patent-holding affiliates mitigates the relation between patent concentration and tax-motivated 
income shifting. These results suggest that local patent-holding affiliates provide the local tax 
authority with a source of comparable information, providing initial support for the argument 
that patent concentration limits the local tax authority’s set of comparable information. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
5.2 Changes in tax enforcement 
Tax-enforcement actions could also provide the local tax authority with more comparable 
information. In a tax audit, for example, the local tax authority could collect pricing information 
on royalty payments between unrelated parties (De Simone, 2016). If patent concentration limits 
the comparable information available to the local tax authority, we expect changes in tax-
 
26 The loss in sample size is due to affiliate-years in country-industry-years with zero patent holdings. We drop these 
observations when calculating HighCompInfo. In additional tests, we set these observations to zero and find 
qualitatively similar results (untabulated).  
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enforcement actions that allow the local tax authority to collect comparable information to 
mitigate the relation documented in our main tests. 
We collect country-level tax-enforcement data from the OECD’s tax-administration 
surveys (OECD, 2011; OECD, 2013; OECD, 2015a; OECD, 2017b). From this data, we extract 
information on i) the value of completed tax assessments over total net revenue collections in 
country c and ii) the percentage of staff used for tax audit and verification in country c. Both 
proxies relate to enforcement actions, such as tax audits, that enable the local tax authority to 
collect comparable information. We construct Enforcement as an indicator variable with the 
value of one if country c experienced an increase in these enforcement actions in the previous 
year. We add Enforcement to Equation (3) and interact it with C, C_Patents, PatentConc, 
C*PatentConc, and C_Patents*PatentConc. We present the results in Table 7.27  
In columns 1 and 2, we define Enforcement based on the value of completed tax 
assessments over total net revenue collections. In column 1, we still find that income shifting is 
increasing in patent concentration. As expected, the coefficients on the triple interactions 
C*PatentConc*Enforcement and C_Patents*PatentConc*Enforcement are positive and 
significant (p < 0.04). We find similar results for affiliates subject to high patent concentration, 
where the coefficient on C_Patents*HighPatentConc*Enforcement is positive and significant in 
column 2 (p < 0.01). In columns 3 and 4, we apply the percentage of staff used in tax audit and 
verification to measure Enforcement. The results are somewhat weaker, yet generally consistent 
with the findings in columns 1 and 2. Overall, these results suggest that increases in tax-
enforcement actions that enable the local tax authority to collect comparable information weaken 
 
27 The loss in sample size is due to the OECD data being unavailable for all sample years. Moreover, data availability 
varies across our proxies, leading to different sample sizes for each test.  
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the association between patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting.   
One concern with these tests is that Enforcement could capture changes in the general tax-
enforcement environment in country c rather than changes in enforcement actions that improve 
the local tax authority’s set of comparable information. To alleviate this concern, we measure 
Enforcement using the costs of tax collection, defined as administrative costs relative to net 
revenue collected. This proxy captures increases in the efficiency of tax collection and 
administration (OECD, 2013) and therefore relates to changes in the general tax-enforcement 
environment of country c. In columns 5 and 6, we continue to find that tax-motivated income 
shifting is increasing in patent concentration. However, the coefficients on all triple interactions 
are insignificant (p > 0.23) and smaller in magnitude than in columns 1 to 4. These results 
suggest that changes in the general tax-enforcement environment are unlikely to drive the results 
in columns 1 to 4.  
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
Taken together, the results in this section suggest that the relation between patent 
concentration and tax-motivated income shifting varies with comparable information available to 
the local tax authority. Therefore, patent concentration seems to facilitate income shifting via 
patents by limiting the local tax authority’s set of comparable information. 
6. Robustness tests and supplementary analyses  
6.1 Robustness tests 
Table 8 reports the results for several sets of robustness tests. First, we follow Hall, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg (2005) and recalculate our measure for patent concentration using the number of 
patent citations as a proxy for patent value (PatentQualityConc). In addition to being associated 
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with the relative number of patents held by an MNC, patent concentration could also increase in 
the value of these patents. Corroborating our main results, the coefficients on 
C*PatentQualityConc and C_Patents*PatentQualityConc remain negative and significant in 
column 1 (p < 0.03).  
Second, we employ alternative approaches to measure income-shifting incentives. In our 
main tests, C and C_Patents capture the incentive to shift income associated with affiliate i 
relative to all other affiliates of the MNC. However, weighting tax-rate differentials by affiliate 
total assets raises the concern that changes in an affiliate’s asset base could affect our results. In 
column 2, we replace C and C_Patents with the statutory corporate income tax rate of country c 
in year t (CTR).28 The coefficients on CTR and CTR*PatentConc are negative and significant 
(p < 0.01), consistent with patent concentration being associated with less (more) income 
reported in high-tax (low-tax) affiliates. In column 3, we include a C measure based on tax rates 
for IP income in year t (C_IP). We again find a negative and significant coefficient on 
C_IP*PatentConc (p = 0.02), again consistent with tax-motivated income shifting increasing in 
patent concentration. Collectively, the results of these tests suggest that our main findings are 
robust to several measures for income-shifting incentives. 
Third, we modify our dependent variable and assess the sample selection associated with 
our empirical approach. In columns 4 and 5, we replace LN(1+ROA) with the natural logarithm 
of earnings before interest (LN(EBIT)) and the natural logarithm of pre-tax income (LN(PLBT)), 
 
28 We do not include the IP tax rate in this test, because non-patent-holding affiliates are unlikely to report taxable 
income subject to this preferential rate. When including the difference between the IP tax rate and the corporate income 
tax rate (CTR_Patents) to capture incremental income-shifting incentives associated with IP-box regimes, the 
coefficients on CTR_Patents and CTR_Patents*PatentConc are indeed insignificant (untabulated; p > 0.36). However, 
when re-estimating this test for patent-holding affiliates, we obtain a negative and significant coefficient on 
CTR_Patents*PatentConc (p = 0.07). Thus, the extent to which taxable income reported by patent-holding affiliates 
is sensitive to preferential IP tax rates is increasing in patent concentration. 
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respectively. This approach follows Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and has been used in prior 
research (Blouin et al., 2018; De Simone, 2016; Markle, 2016). Since the natural logarithm is 
undefined for negative values, loss observations are automatically excluded from the sample. In 
column 4, we find a negative and significant coefficient on C*PatentConc (p < 0.01) while the 
negative coefficient on C_Patents*PatentConc is marginally insignificant (p = 0.14). In column 
5, the coefficients on both interactions remain negative and significant (p < 0.02). These results 
suggest that our main findings are robust to several specifications of the income-shifting model. 
These results also indicate that loss observations are unlikely to drive our main findings. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
Finally, we control for alternative channels that could drive the relation between patent 
concentration and tax-motivated income shifting. More specifically, we interact C and C_Patents 
with MarketShare, GroupSize, and R&DActivity, respectively, to control for the effect of market 
power, MNC group size, and R&D activity on tax-motivated income shifting.29 We continue to 
find negative and significant coefficients on C*PatentConc and C_Patents*PatentConc 
(untabulated; p < 0.08). We obtain similar results when simultaneously including MarketShare, 
GroupSize, and R&DActivity. Overall, after controlling for market power, MNC group size, and 
R&D activity, tax-motivated income shifting is still increasing in patent concentration, which 
suggests that differences in these firm characteristics are unlikely to drive our findings. 
 
29 We proxy for an MNC’s total R&D activity by calculating the number of unique inventors for the patents filed by 
the MNC in year t, scaled by total MNC assets. Alternatively, we control for an MNC’s R&D activity in country c. 
Following De Simone et al. (2020), we extract information on the location of patent inventors from PATSTAT. We 
then count the number of patents filed by the MNC in year t with a unique inventor located in country c. Our results 
are qualitatively similar when using this measure for R&D activity (untabulated).  
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6.2 Falsification test: patent concentration and income shifting via debt  
To further address the concern that general firm characteristics might drive our results, we 
conduct a falsification test and test whether patent concentration is unrelated with income 
shifting in a non-patent setting. More specifically, we examine income shifting via debt, because 
intra-firm interest payments allow an MNC to shift income similar to royalty payments. 
However, the extent to which an MNC exploits this channel should not vary with patent 
concentration. We re-estimate our main tests after replacing the dependent variable with 
LN(1+FROA). This variable is defined as financial income of affiliate i in year t over total assets, 
and captures income shifting via intra-firm debt (Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017). We present 
the results in Table 9.  
In column 1, we replicate the De Simone et al. (2017) income-shifting model with 
LN(1+FROA) as a dependent variable.30 The coefficient on C is negative and significant 
(p < 0.01), providing evidence for tax-motivated income shifting via debt. In columns 2 and 3, 
we interact C with PatentConc and HighPatentConc, respectively, and estimate Equation (3) on 
the subsample of non-patent-holding affiliates. As expected, the coefficients on C*PatentConc 
and C*HighPatentConc are insignificant in both columns (p > 0.16). These results suggest that 
patent concentration is unrelated to tax-motivated income shifting via debt, providing additional 
comfort that general firm characteristics are unlikely to drive our main results.  
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
 
30 We do not include C_Patents in these tests, because this variable captures incremental income-shifting incentives 
associated with IP-box regimes, which do not apply to intra-firm interest payments. The sample in Table 9 is slightly 
larger than in our main tests, since more affiliates report data on financial income. 
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6.3 Patent concentration and inbound income shifting  
Our analysis so far has focused on non-patent-holding affiliates, because PatentConc 
captures the incentives to shift income from a non-patent-holding affiliate to a foreign patent-
holding affiliate (outbound income shifting). However, the degree of patent concentration could 
also be relevant for the MNC when selecting a patent-holding affiliate as a target for shifted 
income (inbound income shifting). More specifically, patent concentration could limit 
comparable information required by the local tax authority to assess the royalty payments 
received by a patent-holding affiliate. Thus, we expect the incentives to shift income to a 
particular patent-holding affiliate to increase in the relative share of patents held by that affiliate.  
We modify our measure for patent concentration and calculate PatentConcHold as the 
number of patents held by all affiliates of the MNC located in country c in year t, divided by the 
sum of patents held by the affiliates of all other MNCs operating in the same country-industry-
year. Thus, we focus on the patents held in the country-industry-year of the patent-holding 
affiliate i as opposed to all patents held by MNCs with affiliates operating the country-industry-
year of affiliate i. We include this measure in Equation (3) and examine the subsample of patent-
holding affiliates. We expect negative coefficients on C*PatentConcHold and 
C_Patents*PatentConcHold, respectively. Table 10 presents the results.  
As expected, the coefficients on C*PatentConcHold and C_Patents*PatentConcHold are 
negative and significant in column 1 (p < 0.08). In column 2, we again use an indicator variable 
with the value of one if PatentConcHold is in the top sample quartile. Corroborating the results 
in column 1, the coefficients on C*HighPatentConcHold and C_Patents*HighPatentConcHold 
are negative and significant (p < 0.04). Overall, these results suggest that the extent to which 
taxable income reported by a patent-holding affiliate is sensitive to income-shifting incentives 
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increases in patent concentration. Thus, by reducing the local tax authority’s set of comparable 
information, patent concentration may not only facilitate outbound income shifting, but may also 
increase the attractiveness of a patent-holding affiliate as a target for shifted income.  
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine whether and to what extent patent concentration is associated 
with tax-motivated income shifting. Using unconsolidated financial statement data and 
information on MNCs’ patent holdings, we show that tax-motivated income shifting is increasing 
in the degree of patent concentration. To identify the mechanism behind this result, we exploit 
two settings in which comparable information available to the local tax authority is likely to 
vary. Our results suggest that patent concentration facilitates tax-motivated income shifting via 
patents by reducing the local tax authority’s set of comparable information and by increasing 
asymmetric information between the MNC and the local tax authority.  
Our study contributes to research on the determinants of tax-motivated income shifting by 
identifying patent concentration as an economically important driver of the extent to which 
MNCs shift income via patents. Moreover, our findings indicate that industry landscapes in 
which an MNC operates and the availability of comparable firms or assets tend to shape the 
incentives for income shifting. More broadly, our results add to the patent literature by showing 
that patent concentration is associated with tax-motivated income shifting. From a policy 
perspective, our findings suggest that the success of tax-policy measures in curtailing tax-
motivated income shifting via patents critically depends on their ability to improve the local tax 
authority’s set of comparable information.   
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
Dependent variables 
LN(EBIT) Natural logarithm of affiliate i’s EBIT in year t. 
  
LN(PLBT) Natural logarithm of affiliate i’s PLBT in year t. 
  
LN(1+FROA) Natural logarithm of 1 plus affiliate i’s FROA in year t.  
  
LN(1+ROA) Natural logarithm of 1 plus affiliate i’s ROA in year t.  
  
Measures for income-shifting incentives 
C Income-shifting incentives associated with affiliate i based on 
statutory corporate income tax rates. To calculate C, we follow the 
approach in Huizinga and Laeven (2008):  
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  
1
(1 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡)
∗  
∑
𝐾𝑘𝑡
(1 − 𝜏𝑘𝑡)
∗ (𝜏𝑖𝑡 − 𝜏𝑘𝑡)
𝑛
𝑘 ≠𝑖
∑
𝐾𝑘,𝑡
(1 − 𝜏𝑘𝑡)
𝑛
𝑘 ≠𝑖
 
C includes the tax-rate differentials between affiliate i and all 
other affiliates of the MNC in year t. We weight tax-rate 
differentials by total affiliate assets. Source: EY Corporate Tax 
Guides. 
  
C_IP Income shifting incentives associated with affiliate i based on the 
tax rates on IP income in year t. C_IP includes the tax-rate 
differentials between affiliate i and all other affiliates of the MNC 
in year t. We weight tax-rate differentials by total affiliate assets. 
Source: EY Corporate Tax Guides. 
  
C_Patents Incremental income-shifting incentives associated with affiliate i 
based on preferential tax rates on IP income. C_Patents is 
calculated by subtracting C from C_IP. Source: EY Corporate Tax 
Guides. 
  
CTR Statutory corporate income tax rate in country c in year t. Source: 
EY Corporate Tax Guides. 
  
CTR_Patents Preferential tax rate on IP income in country c in year t less CTR 
in year t. Source: EY Corporate Tax Guides. 
 
Measures for patent concentration  
PatentConc Patent concentration for affiliate i in year t calculated as the 
number of patents held by all affiliates of the MNC in year t, 
divided by the sum of patents held by all MNCs with affiliates 
operating in the same country-industry-year as affiliate i. Industry 
is defined based on two-digit NACE industry codes. Source: Orbis 
and PATSTAT. 
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PatentConcHold Patent concentration for patent-holding affiliate i in year t 
calculated as the number of patents held by all domestic affiliates 
of the MNC located in country c in year t, divided by the sum of 
patents held by affiliates of all other MNCs operating in the same 
country-industry-year. Industry is defined based on two-digit 
NACE industry codes. Source: Orbis and PATSTAT. 
  
HighPatentConc Indicator variable with the value of one if PatentConc of affiliate i 
is in the top sample quartile, and zero otherwise.  
  
HighPatentConcHold Indicator variable with the value of one if PatentConcHold of 
affiliate i is in the top sample quartile, and zero otherwise. 
  
PatentQualityConc Patent concentration for affiliate i in year t based on the number of 
patent citations on the patents held by all affiliates of the MNC in 
year t, divided by the number of patent citations on the patents 
held by all MNCs with affiliates operating in the same country-
industry-year as affiliate i. Industry is defined based on two-digit 
NACE industry codes. Source: Orbis and PATSTAT. 
  
Measures for patent stock  
PatStock Number of granted patents held by affiliate i in year t. We include 
all patents granted between the year t and t-19. Source: 
PATSTAT. 
  
SumPatents Number of patents held by all affiliates of the MNC (PatStock) in 
year t. Source: Orbis and PATSTAT. 
  
Control variables 
TangibleAssets Total fixed assets of affiliate i in year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
LN(TangibleAssets) Natural logarithm of affiliate i’s TangibleAssets in year t. 
  
CompExpense Compensation expenses of affiliate i in year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
LN(CompExpense) Natural logarithm of affiliate i’s CompExpense in year t. 
  
IndustryROA Country-industry-year median ROA for all firms included in the 
Orbis database. Industry is defined based on two-digit NACE 
industry codes. Source: Orbis 
  
Age Year t less the first year in which affiliate i appears in the Orbis 
database. Source: Orbis. 
  
LN(Age) Natural logarithm of Age. 
  
GDPGrowth Annual change in GDP from year t-1 to year t in affiliate country 
c. Source: World Bank National Accounts Data. 
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ΔMarketSize Annual percentage change in total sales of all affiliates and 
independent firms by country-industry-year. Industry is defined 
based on two-digit NACE industry codes. Source: Orbis. 
  
Loss Indicator variable with the value of one if EBIT of affiliate i is 
negative, and zero otherwise.  
  
Other variables 
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes of affiliate i in year t. Source: 
Orbis. 
  
FROA Financial income of affiliate i in year t, scaled by total assets of 
affiliate i in year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
GroupSize Natural logarithm of the MNC’s number of affiliates in year t. 
Source: Orbis. 
  
MarketShare Total sales of affiliate i in year t, divided by total sales of all firms 
in the same country-industry-year. Industry is defined based on 
two-digit NACE industry codes. Source: Orbis. 
  
PLBT Pre-tax profit of affiliate i in year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
R&DActivity Number of unique investors for the patents filed by all affiliates of 
the MNC in year t, divided by aggregate total assets of all 
affiliates of the MNC in year t. Source: Orbis and PATSTAT. 
  
ROA EBIT of affiliate i in year t, scaled by total assets of affiliate i in 
year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
Partitioning variables 
HighCompInfo Indicator variable with the value of one if the ratio of patent-
holding affiliates relative to all affiliates of MNCs operating in a 
country-industry-year is in the top sample quartile. Industry is 
defined based on two-digit NACE industry codes. Source: Orbis 
and PATSTAT. 
  
Enforcement First, an indicator variable with the value of one if country c 
experienced an increase in the value of completed tax assessments 
over total net revenue collections in the previous year (i.e., from 
year t-2 to t-1), and zero otherwise. Second, an indicator variable 
with the value of one if country c experienced an increase in the 
percentage of staff used for tax audit and verification in the 
previous year. Third, an indicator variable with the value of one if 
country c experienced a decrease in the cost of collection ratio 
(measured as administrative costs for tax administration, scaled by 
net revenue collected) in the previous year. Source: OECD, 2011; 
2013; 2015a; 2017b. 
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Sample selection 
Sample selection Affiliate-Years 
European firms in Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database with at least one affiliate 
located in another European country, non-missing NACE industry codes, 
and positive values for total assets, tangible fixed assets and 
compensation expenses (sample period: 2008-2016). 
163,865 
Less: Affiliates of MNCs active in banking or insurance industries (two-digit 
NACE codes: 64, 65, or 66). 
(2,148) 
Less: Affiliate-years of MNCs with a negative return on sales in year t.  (20,873) 
Less: Affiliate-years with missing values for EBIT and with values for 
LN(1+ROA) less than or equal to zero. 
(566) 
Less: Affiliate-years with missing data to compute regression variables. (1,985) 
Final sample 138,293 
Note: This table summarizes the sample selection procedure. We obtain unconsolidated affiliate-level 
financial statement data and ownership data from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. 
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APPENDIX B:  
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES FOR C_PATENTS AND PATENTCONC 
Numerical example for C_Patents 
In this section, we provide additional background on the calculation of C_Patents. In 
addition, we discuss why a negative coefficient on C_Patents in Equation (3) is consistent with 
tax-motivated income shifting. As discussed in Section 3.2, we calculate C_Patents to account 
for incremental income-shifting incentives not captured by C, because several countries in our 
sample provide preferential tax rates for IP income. To obtain C_Patents, we first recalculate C 
for affiliate i in year t, using IP tax rates instead of statutory corporate income tax rates (C_IP). 
We then subtract C from C_IP to obtain a measure that captures the incremental income-shifting 
incentives associated with IP tax rates (C_Patents).  
In the numerical example below, which is based on the examples provided by Markle 
(2016), we calculate C, C_IP, and C_Patents for Affiliates 1-4. All affiliates belong to the same 
MNC. The negative value of C for Affiliate 1 (-0.24) indicates an incentive to shift income from 
affiliates with higher values of C to Affiliate 1. The positive value of C_Patents (0.14), however, 
suggests that preferential IP tax rates weaken the incentive to shift income from other affiliates. 
If the MNC is sensitive to this weaker incentive, less taxable income should be reported by 
Affiliate 1 compared to a situation without preferential IP tax rates (i.e., less income is shifted to 
Affiliate 1 via patents), suggesting a negative coefficient on C_Patents in our analysis. 
Conversely, C is positive for Affiliate 2 (0.15), indicating an incentive to shift income 
from Affiliate 2 to affiliates with lower values of C. The positive value of C_Patents (0.03) 
strengthens the incentive to shift income from Affiliate 2 to other affiliates via patents. If the 
MNC is responsive to this incentive, less taxable income is reported in Affiliate 2 compared to a 
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situation without preferential IP tax rates, again suggesting a negative coefficient on C_Patents 
in our analysis.  
For Affiliates 3 and 4, the negative values of C (-0.08 and -0.02) indicate an incentive to 
shift taxable income from other affiliates of the MNC to Affiliates 3 and 4. In both cases, the 
negative values of C_Patents (-0.03 and -0.02) imply a stronger incentive to shift income to 
Affiliates 3 and 4 via patents. Thus, compared to a situation without preferential IP tax rates, 
both affiliates should report more taxable income, again suggesting a negative coefficient on 
C_Patents in our analysis.  
Affiliate 
Statutory Tax 
Rate (%) 
IP Tax 
Rate (%) 
Assets C C_IP 
C_Patents 
(C_IP – C) 
Affiliate 1 10% 5% 10 -0.24 -0.10 0.14 
Affiliate 2 40% 30% 80 0.15 0.18 0.03 
Affiliate 3 25% 0% 100 -0.08 -0.12 -0.03* 
Affiliate 4 30% 10% 50 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
* Rounding difference: -0.084 - 0.116 = -0.032. 
Numerical example for PatentConc 
Figure 1 illustrates our approach to measure PatentConc. In this section, we provide a 
numerical example for how to calculate PatentConc for the German affiliate of MNC 1 in 
Figure 1 (hereafter, affiliate i). We assume that affiliate i and the German affiliates of the other 
MNCs included in Figure 1 (i.e., of MNCs 2-4 in panel A and of MNC 2 in panel B) operate in 
the same two-digit NACE industry-year.  
We calculate PatentConc for affiliate i as the sum of patents held by all domestic and 
foreign affiliates of MNC 1, divided by the sum of patents held by all domestic and foreign 
affiliates of MNCs operating in the same country-industry-year (CIY) as affiliate i. The latter 
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includes the number of patents held by MNC 1. This measure reflects the share of patents held 
by MNC 1 relative to all other MNCs with affiliates operating in the same CIY as affiliate i. 
In both panels of Figure 1, the sum of patents held by MNCs operating in the same CIY as 
affiliate i is equal to four. In the case of low patent concentration (panel A), MNC 1 holds one 
patent so that PatentConc of affiliate i is equal to 0.25 (= 1 / (1+3)). In the case of high patent 
concentration (panel B), MNC 1 holds three patents. PatentConc of affiliate i is therefore equal 
to 0.75 (= 3 / (3+1)). Due to dividing the number of patents held by the affiliates of an MNC by 
the number of patents held by all MNCs operating in the same CIY, PatentConc is constrained to 
range from zero to one. We summarize this example in the table below.  
Patent Concentration  Low  High 
Σ of Patents held by MNC 1 1  3 
Σ of Patents held by all other MNCs operating in the same CIY 3  1 
Σ of Patents held in CIY 4  4 
PatentConc = Σ of Patents held by MNC 1 / Σ of Patents held in CIY 0.25 
 
0.75 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1: Patent Concentration 
Panel A: Low Patent Concentration 
 
 
Panel B: High Patent Concentration 
 
 
Note: This figure illustrates our empirical approach to measure patent concentration (PatentConc). In panel A, patent 
concentration is low, because several MNCs operating in the same country-industry-year as MNC 1 hold at least one 
patent. Therefore, when assessing the transfer price for intra-firm royalty payments set by MNC 1, the local tax 
authority has access to a large set of comparable information from the transactions of other MNCs with their unrelated 
customers. In panel B, patent concentration is high, because patent holdings are strongly concentrated in MNC 1. 
Therefore, the local tax authority has limited comparable information from the transactions of other MNCs when 
assessing the transfer price set by MNC 1.  
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Table 1: Sample composition by country 
Country Affiliate-Years 
Mean  
Corporate Tax Rate 
Mean 
IP Tax Rate 
Austria 2,602 0.25 0.25 
Belgium 10,963 0.34 0.07 
Bulgaria 708 0.10 0.10 
Czech Republic 6,218 0.19 0.19 
Denmark 104 0.24 0.24 
Estonia 1,350 0.21 0.21 
Finland 4,776 0.23 0.23 
France 19,254 0.33 0.16 
Germany 12,118 0.30 0.30 
Hungary 2,452 0.19 0.09 
Iceland 41 0.19 0.19 
Ireland 3 0.13 0.10 
Italy 18,278 0.31 0.29 
Latvia 52 0.15 0.15 
Luxembourg 745 0.29 0.06 
Malta 32 0.35 0.12 
Netherlands 540 0.25 0.06 
Norway 5,870 0.27 0.27 
Poland 5,721 0.19 0.19 
Portugal 6,788 0.24 0.20 
Romania 4,228 0.16 0.16 
Slovakia  3,463 0.21 0.21 
Slovenia 1,356 0.18 0.18 
Spain 18,019 0.29 0.14 
Sweden 10,197 0.24 0.24 
Switzerland 41 0.18 0.12 
United Kingdom 849 0.24 0.18 
All Countries 138,293 0.23 0.17 
Note: This table presents the sample composition by country. Our sample includes 138,293 affiliate-
year observations for the sample period 2008-2016. Column 1 presents the number of affiliate-years. 
Column 2 (3) presents the mean statutory corporate income tax rate (the mean IP tax rate) by country.   
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Variables N Mean P25 Median P75 SD 
EBIT 138,293 3,082,883 55,000 395,000 1,564,000 42,753,300 
ROA 138,293 0.075 0.014 0.057 0.131 0.135 
LN(1+ROA) 138,293 0.065 0.014 0.055 0.123 0.128 
TangibleAssets 138,293 7,045,321 103,000 740,000 4,056,000 20,896,530 
CompExpense 138,293 5,860,280 626,000 1,804,000 4,993,000 12,607,610 
LN(TangibleAssets) 138,293 6.434 4.635 6.607 8.308 2.561 
LN(CompExpense) 138,293 7.461 6.439 7.498 8.516 1.628 
IndustryROA 138,293 0.038 0.020 0.037 0.055 0.026 
LN(Age) 138,293 1.430 1.099 1.609 1.946 0.653 
GDPGrowth 138,293 -0.008 -0.078 0.011 0.046 0.083 
ΔMarketSize 138,293 0.012 -0.066 0.009 0.073 0.123 
Loss 138,293 0.171 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.376 
C 138,293 -0.008 -0.008 0.001 0.010 0.050 
C_Patents 138,293 -0.004 -0.019 0.000 0.012 0.074 
PatentConc 138,293 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.168 
PatStock 138,293 2.849 0.000 0.000 0.000 40.035 
SumPatents 138,293 35.622 0.000 0.000 5.000 230.668 
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Panel B: Patent-holding affiliates (PatStock > 0) 
Variables N Mean P25 Median P75 SD 
EBIT 14,412 10,682,310 455,500 1,913,000 6,103,000 77,282,440 
ROA 14,412 0.076 0.023 0.059 0.119 0.102 
LN(1+ROA) 14,412 0.068 0.022 0.057 0.112 0.096 
TangibleAssets 14,412 17,919,270 1,250,000 5,453,500 16,493,000 33,040,140 
CompExpense 14,412 16,401,390 3,044,000 7,639,000 19,524,000 21,687,950 
LN(TangibleAssets) 14,412 8.319 7.131 8.604 9.711 2.074 
LN(CompExpense) 14,412 8.908 8.021 8.941 9.879 1.380 
IndustryROA 14,412 0.047 0.030 0.043 0.066 0.026 
LN(Age) 14,412 1.498 1.099 1.609 1.946 0.626 
GDPGrowth 14,412 -0.009 -0.083 0.011 0.046 0.079 
ΔMarketSize 14,412 0.008 -0.072 0.006 0.073 0.123 
Loss 14,412 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.316 
C 14,412 0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.011 0.028 
C_Patents 14,412 0.008 -0.004 0.001 0.016 0.060 
PatentConc 14,412 0.095 0.002 0.012 0.070 0.208 
PatStock 14,412 27.341 2.000 5.000 16.000 121.289 
SumPatents 14,412 69.727 3.000 10.000 40.000 259.430 
 
Panel C: Non-patent-holding affiliates (PatStock = 0) 
Variables N Mean P25 Median P75 SD 
EBIT 123,881 2,198,785*** 45,000 333,000***    1,275,000 36,581,430 
ROA 123,881 0.075    0.013 0.056***    0.132 0.138 
LN(1+ROA) 123,881 0.064*** 0.013 0.055***    0.124 0.132 
TangibleAssets 123,881 5,780,274*** 85,000 586,000***    3,096,000 18,577,340 
CompExpense 123,881 4,633,954*** 558,000 1,541,000***    4,054,000 10,406,500 
LN(TangibleAssets) 123,881 6.215*** 4.443 6.373***    8.038 2.521 
LN(CompExpense) 123,881 7.293*** 6.324 7.340***    8.307 1.571 
IndustryROA 123,881 0.037*** 0.018 0.036***    0.054 0.026 
LN(Age) 123,881 1.422*** 1.099 1.609***    1.946 0.656 
GDPGrowth 123,881 -0.008  -0.078 0.011    0.046 0.083 
ΔMarketSize 123,881 0.013*** -0.065 0.010***    0.073 0.123 
Loss 123,881 0.178*** 0.000 0.000***    0.000 0.382 
C 123,881 -0.010*** -0.011 0.000***    0.010 0.051 
C_Patents 123,881 -0.005*** -0.022 0.000***    0.012 0.076 
PatentConc 123,881 0.042*** 0.000 0.000***   0.002 0.162 
PatStock 123,881 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***    0.000 0.000 
SumPatents 123,881 31.654*** 0.000 0.000***    3.000 226.754 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of 138,293 
affiliate-year observations (sample period 2008-2016). Panel B presents descriptive statistics for patent-holding affiliates 
(14,412 affiliate-year observations) and panel C for non-patent-holding affiliates (123,811 affiliate-year observations), 
respectively. We conduct a two-sample t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) to compare means (medians) between panels B 
and C. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 3: Correlation table  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) LN(1+ROA) 1.000           
(2) LN(TangibleAssets) -0.061 1.000          
(3) LN(CompExpense) 0.037 0.588 1.000         
(4) IndustryROA 0.111 0.014 0.195 1.000        
(5) LN(Age) 0.001 0.029 0.077 -0.127 1.000       
(6) GDPGrowth 0.026 0.004 0.006 0.118 -0.224 1.000      
(7) ΔMarketSize 0.039 0.004 -0.008 0.135 -0.434 0.381 1.000     
(8) Loss -0.622 -0.050 -0.098 -0.077 -0.037 -0.013 -0.014 1.000    
(9) C -0.031 0.020 0.176 0.071 0.034 -0.040 -0.060 -0.014 1.000   
(10) C_Patents 0.007 0.010 0.056 0.060 0.012 -0.013 -0.027 -0.015 0.132 1.000  
(11) PatentConc -0.018 0.090 0.072 -0.035 -0.033 0.017 0.026 0.034 -0.135 -0.053 1.000 
Note: This table presents univariate Pearson correlation coefficients for the full sample of 138,293 affiliate-year observations (sample period 
2008-2016). Bold coefficients denote significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 4: Extending the De Simone et al. (2017) income-shifting model 
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
LN(TangibleAssets)  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.005*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LN(CompExpense)  0.003***  0.003***  0.003*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
IndustryROA  0.217***  0.218***  0.218*** 
  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
LN(Age)  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
GDPGrowth  0.022**  0.022**  0.022** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
ΔMarketSize  0.005  0.005  0.005 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
C  -0.097***  -0.105***  -0.101*** 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
C_Patents    -0.009  -0.003 
    (0.007)  (0.008) 
Loss  -0.208***  -0.208***  -0.208*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
C*Loss  0.289***  0.289***  0.269*** 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.031) 
C_Patents*Loss      -0.026 
            (0.019) 
Country-FE  Y  Y  Y 
Industry-FE  Y  Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y   Y   Y 
N  138,293  138,293  138,293 
Adjusted R²  0.419   0.419   0.419 
Note: This table presents regression results for extending the income-shifting model 
by De Simone, Klassen, and Seidman (2017) on the full sample of 138,293 affiliate-
year observations. The dependent variable is LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings 
before interest and taxes of affiliate i, divided by total assets. All columns include 
country, industry, and year fixed-effects. We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 5: Patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting   
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)  
   (1)  (2)  
C  -0.087***  -0.084***  
  (0.016)  (0.017)  
C_Patents  0.002  0.003  
  (0.009)  (0.009)  
Loss  -0.211***  -0.211***  
  (0.002)  (0.002)  
C*Loss  0.253***  0.252***  
  (0.032)  (0.032)  
C_Patents*Loss  -0.030  -0.030  
  (0.020)  (0.020)  
PatentConc  -0.010**    
  (0.004)    
C*PatentConc  -0.144***    
  (0.050)    
C_Patents*PatentConc  -0.064**    
  (0.031)    
HighPatentConc    -0.002  
    (0.002)  
C*HighPatentConc    -0.071**  
    (0.032)  
C_Patents*HighPatentConc   -0.035*  
        (0.020)   
Additional Controls  Y  Y  
Country-FE  Y  Y  
Industry-FE  Y  Y  
Year-FE   Y   Y   
N  123,881  123,881  
Adjusted R²  0.425   0.425   
Note: This table presents regression results for the relation between patent 
concentration and tax-motivated income shifting. All columns include the 
subsample of non-patent-holding affiliates (123,811 affiliate-year observations). 
The dependent variable is LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings before interest 
and taxes of affiliate i, divided by total assets. All columns include country, 
industry, and year fixed-effects. We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 6: Local patent-holding affiliates 
Dependent Variable   LN(1+ROA)   LN(1+ROA)   
   (1)  (2)   
C  -0.100***  -0.096***  
  (0.019)  (0.019)  
C_Patents  -0.002  0.000  
  (0.010)  (0.010)  
Loss  -0.209***  -0.209***  
  (0.002)  (0.002)  
C*Loss  0.254***  0.253***  
  (0.035)  (0.035)  
C_Patents*Loss  -0.019  -0.019  
  (0.021)  (0.021)  
C*PatentConc  -0.185***    
  (0.068)    
C_Patents*PatentConc  -0.071*    
  (0.041)    
C*PatentConc*HighCompInfo  0.191    
  (0.140)    
C_Patents*PatentConc*HighCompInfo  0.076    
  (0.082)    
C*HighPatentConc    -0.118***  
    (0.042)  
C_Patents*HighPatentConc    -0.063**  
    (0.026)  
C*HighPatentConc*HighCompInfo    0.184**  
    (0.076)  
C_Patents*HighPatentConc*HighCompInfo    0.102**  
        (0.044)   
Additional Controls  Y  Y  
Country-FE  Y  Y  
Industry-FE  Y  Y  
Year-FE   Y   Y   
N  112,687  112,687  
Adjusted R²   0.421   0.421   
Note: This table presents regression results for the moderating effect of local patent-holding 
affiliates. The dependent variable is LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings before interest and 
taxes of affiliate i, divided by total assets. All columns include country, industry, and year fixed-
effects. We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 7: Changes in tax enforcement 
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)    LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)    LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA) 
   (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)    (5)   (6) 
Enforcement  Completed Tax Assessments    Staff Usage for Verification    Costs of Collection Ratio 
C  -0.064**  -0.059**    -0.082***  -0.081***    -0.083***  -0.084*** 
  (0.025)  (0.025)    (0.028)  (0.028)    (0.020)  (0.021) 
C_Patents  0.026**  0.025**    0.013  0.017    0.006  0.007 
  (0.013)  (0.013)    (0.017)  (0.017)    (0.011)  (0.011) 
Loss  -0.195***  -0.195***    -0.197***  -0.197***    -0.205***  -0.205*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.002)  (0.002) 
C*Loss  0.198***  0.197***    0.237***  0.235***    0.259***  0.258*** 
  (0.043)  (0.043)    (0.057)  (0.057)    (0.037)  (0.037) 
C_Patents*Loss  -0.038  -0.039    -0.000  0.000    -0.043*  -0.042* 
  (0.029)  (0.029)    (0.034)  (0.034)    (0.023)  (0.023) 
C*PatentConc  -0.195**      -0.285***      -0.184***   
  (0.080)      (0.104)      (0.070)   
C_Patents*PatentConc  -0.070      -0.213***      -0.078*   
  (0.047)      (0.070)      (0.042)   
C*Enforcement  0.002  0.007    -0.014  -0.018    -0.002  -0.000 
  (0.022)  (0.023)    (0.030)  (0.030)    (0.016)  (0.016) 
C_Patents*Enforcement  0.002  -0.004    -0.016  -0.021    -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.012)  (0.012)    (0.018)  (0.018)    (0.009)  (0.009) 
C*PatentConc*Enforcement  0.191**      0.203      0.055   
  (0.092)      (0.152)      (0.069)   
C_Patents*PatentConc*Enforcement  0.162***      0.163      0.035   
  (0.055)      (0.104)      (0.042)   
C*HighPatentConc    -0.099**      -0.123*      -0.071* 
    (0.047)      (0.063)      (0.042) 
C_Patents*HighPatentConc    -0.022      -0.135***      -0.046* 
    (0.033)      (0.041)      (0.027) 
C*HighPatentConc*Enforcement    0.060      0.104      0.008 
    (0.052)      (0.080)      (0.040) 
C_Patents*HighPatentConc*Enforcement    0.132***      0.115**      0.031 
        (0.035)         (0.053)         (0.026) 
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Additional Controls  Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y 
Country-FE  Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y 
Industry-FE  Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y   Y     Y   Y     Y   Y 
N  41,632  41,632    22,409  22,409    78,418  78,418 
Adjusted R²   0.422   0.422     0.409   0.409     0.423   0.423 
Note: This table presents regression results for the moderating effect of changes in country-level tax enforcement. In columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4), Enforcement 
is an indicator variable with the value of one if country c experienced an increase in the value of completed tax assessments (staff usage for verification) in 
the previous year. In columns 5 and 6, Enforcement is an indicator variable with the value of one if country c experienced a decrease in the costs of collection 
ratio in the previous year. The dependent variable is LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings before interest and taxes of affiliate i, divided by total assets. 
All columns include country, industry, and year fixed-effects. We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 8: Robustness tests 
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA
) 
 LN(1+ROA)  LN(EBIT)  LN(PLBT) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
C  -0.085***      0.100  -0.197 
  (0.016)      (0.229)  (0.262) 
C_Patents  0.002      0.188  0.232* 
  (0.009)      (0.123)  (0.138) 
CTR    -0.114***       
    (0.032)       
Loss  -0.211***  -0.316***  -0.214***     
  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.002)     
C*Loss  0.252***         
  (0.032)         
C_Patents*Loss  -0.030         
  (0.020)         
CTR*Loss    0.370***       
    (0.028)       
C_IP      -0.006     
      (0.009)     
C_IP*Loss      -0.000     
      (0.019)     
PatentQualityConc  -0.008*         
  (0.004)         
C*PatentQualityConc  -0.152***         
  (0.051)         
C_Patents*PatentQualityConc  -0.072**         
  (0.032)         
PatentConc    0.038***  -0.005  0.028  0.135* 
    (0.013)  (0.004)  (0.066)  (0.072) 
CTR*PatentConc    -0.167***       
    (0.052)       
C_IP*PatentConc      -0.070**     
      (0.030)     
C*PatentConc        -2.230***  -2.294** 
        (0.829)  (0.900) 
C_Patents*PatentConc        -0.781  -1.444** 
        (0.530)  (0.587) 
Additional Controls   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Country-FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry-FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
N  123,881  123,881  123,881  101,654  99,380 
Adjusted R²   0.425   0.426   0.422   0.486   0.440 
Note: This table presents regression results for robustness tests. In columns 1-3, the dependent variable is 
LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings before interest and taxes of affiliate i, divided by total assets. In column 
4, the dependent variable is LN(EBIT). In column 5, the dependent variable is LN(PLBT). All columns include 
country, industry, and year fixed-effects. We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by affiliate 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 9: Falsification test: income shifting via debt 
Dependent Variable  LN(1+FROA)   LN(1+FROA)  LN(1+FROA) 
   (1)   (2)  (3) 
C  -0.014***   -0.017***  -0.017*** 
  (0.004)   (0.005)  (0.005) 
Loss  -0.032***   -0.032***  -0.032*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
C*Loss  0.034***   0.039***  0.039*** 
  (0.005)   (0.005)  (0.005) 
PatentConc     -0.001   
     (0.001)   
C*PatentConc     -0.013   
     (0.010)   
HighPatentConc       -0.001 
       (0.000) 
C*HighPatentConc       -0.008 
              (0.006) 
Additional Controls  Y   Y  Y 
Country-FE  Y   Y  Y 
Industry-FE  Y   Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y     Y   Y 
N  138,595   124,169  124,169 
Adjusted R²   0.353     0.347   0.347 
Note: This table presents regression results for a falsification test based on income shifting via 
debt. Column 1 presents results for the income-shifting model by De Simone, Klassen, and 
Seidman (2017) based on the full sample (138,595 affiliate-year observations). Columns 2 and 3 
present results for the relation between patent concentration and income-shifting via debt based 
on the subsample of non-patent-holding affiliates (124,169 affiliate-year observations). The 
dependent variable is LN(1+FROA). FROA is defined as financial income of affiliate i, divided 
by total assets. All columns include country, industry, and year fixed-effects. We report 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10: Patent Concentration and patent-holding affiliates   
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)  
   (1)  (2)  
C  -0.002  -0.042  
  (0.072)  (0.069)  
C_Patents  0.012  0.008  
  (0.026)  (0.025)  
Loss  -0.166***  -0.166***  
  (0.005)  (0.005)  
C*Loss  0.212  0.207  
  (0.155)  (0.155)  
C_Patents*Loss  -0.017  -0.017  
  (0.052)  (0.052)  
PatentConcHold  -0.004    
  (0.006)    
C*PatentConcHold  -0.622***    
  (0.175)    
C_Patents*PatentConcHold  -0.133*    
  (0.077)    
HighPatentConcHold    -0.002  
    (0.004)  
C*HighPatentConcHold    -0.459***  
    (0.147)  
C_Patents*HighPatentConcHold    -0.118**  
        (0.057)   
Additional Controls  Y  Y  
Country-FE  Y  Y  
Industry-FE  Y  Y  
Year-FE   Y   Y   
N  14,412  14,412  
Adjusted R²  0.383   0.382   
Note: This table presents regression results for the relation between patent 
concentration and inbound income shifting. All columns include the subsample of 
patent-holding affiliates (14,412 affiliate-year observations). The dependent variable 
is LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings before interest and taxes of affiliate i, 
divided by total assets. All columns include country, industry, and year fixed-effects. 
We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by affiliate in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
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